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HIV/AIDS in Africa
SANDRA

F.

jOIREMAN

he response of the United States to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa
is an example of the redefined nature of security threats that characterizes the post-September 11 period. Even the most ardent realists now accept
that serious threats exist to US security apart from those brewing in organized states. Scholars and governments have been forced to adopt a greater
sensitivity to the issues that underlie international violence and terrorism,
such as a lack of political freedom, state failure, poverty, and HIV/AIDS,
the topic addressed in this chapter as an indirect threat to US security interests in Africa. I
The US response to HIV/AIDS in Africa reflects the way in which
Africa fits into the US national security agenda. Although increased awareness of the causes of terrorism has made Africa more critical to the national
security agenda of the United States than it has been in the past, the African
security concerns of greatest interest to US policymakers are terrorism and
state failure. But a state cannot stand when great numbers of its peoples are
decimated by disease. HIVI AIDS shares three similarities with poverty as a
contributing factor to state failure. Both are regionalized, are temporally
less immediate, and address human security insofar as they affect international security.
For the most part, African states do not pose a direct political threat to
US security interests. The United States neither faces strong ideological
enemies on the African continent nor engages in the kind of proxy wars that
characterized the Cold War. With the recent opening of Libya to
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, the actual national security
threats to the United States from African governments are relatively few.
However, economic underdevelopment, coupled with HIV/AIDS, may produce an environment in which weak or even failed states are unable to stem
the growth of terrorist groups within their borders-groups that may or may
not be linked up to international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida or
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' occasionally materialIslamic Jihad. Moreover, other threats to US security
ize in states unable to adequately police their own borders and assert state
control outside the capital. An excellent example of just such a threat was
the recent attempt to illegally export uranium from the Democratic Republic
ofCongo.2
HIV/AIDS is a security threat, but it is indirect and played out at multiple levels of analysis: within individual bodies; clustered within families
and communities, wreaking havoc on their ability to cope with the day to
day challenges ofliving; and with destabilizing effects on the state.3 It is the
pervasiveness of the disease and the lack of treatment that multiplies its
effect to the point that it becomes a security issue for states. Through the
challenges it creates within those states, it emerges as an international security issue. Thus, HIV/AIDS links human security and international security
in unique ways. AIDS is a disease; it is neither a weapon nor a state.4 Yet it
has been perceived by two US administrations as a threat to national security because of its potential for destabilizing states. This fact is worthy of
note: it is the first time that a disease has been interpreted as a national
security threat.
After a brief description of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, I identify the development of HIV/AIDS as a perceived security threat and detail
the specific security issues presented by HIVI AIDS in Africa. Then, I
explore the li'nkages between national security and the recently passed
"Global AIDS Bill." Last, I discuss the divergence of perspectives between
African states and the United States regarding the threat of HIV/AIDS. I
then make some observations regarding the future of HIVI AIDS as a security threat in Africa and the development of the "next" wave of HIV/AIDS in
South Asia.

The HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa

Africa remains the continent most affected by HIV/AIDS. Eighty-one percent of the world's AIDS-related deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa.5 The
prevalence of AIDS (7.5-8.5 percent of the total population) is higher in
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world. An estimated 2.4 million adults and children died from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005.6 At
least 2 million adults are infected in Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and
Nigeria, and one in four adults have contracted the virus in Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.7 Furthermore, most of the
world's women suffering from the AIDS virus-a shocking 83 percentlive in sub-Saharan Africa.s
On the African continent, HIV infection rates are not similar in all
countries and all areas. The World Health Organization divides the conti-
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nent up ·into regions; of these, southern Africa suffers the most, with its
prevalence rates rising from 20.3 percent in 1997-1998 to 25.7 percent in
2001-2002. These percentages may result from the higher levels of urbanization found in southern Africa. East Africa's prevalence rate has decreased
slightly, from a high of 13.7 percent to 11.4 percent, which is partially
attributable to the significant and consistent HIVI AIDS awareness campaign by the Ugandan government. This trend has been followed by other
countries in the region, most notably Ethiopia, where in the capital of Addis
Ababa HIV prevalence rates for fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old pregnant
women dropped from 24 percent in 1995 to 11 percent in 2003,. The AIDS
prevalence in West Africa has fallen slightly from 4.4 percent in 1999-2000
to 3.1 percent in 2003-2004.9
It is important to unpack these statistics in order to understand the
nature of the epidemic and how it affects different countries. We can do that
by looking at three "snapshots" of African countries dealing with
HIV/AIDS: Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia. I have chosen these three
because they are all politically stable, not currently at war, and at very different points in terms of the response to the pandemic and its prevalence
within their borders.
Uganda

Uganda was one of the first African countries to experience the full impact
of HIVI AIDS. At the height of the epidemic, infection rates were 14 percent
throughout the country and much higher in some areas.10 Now HIV infection rates are down to 8 percent because most of the people infected earlier
have died. Uganda has experienced the peculiar demographic challenge of
HIV/AIDS; for example, the virus attacks people who are most sexually
active and most economically productive (those between t_he ages of fifteen
and forty-five). Uganda has suffered from a lack of teachers and medical
professionals as a result of the epidemic. Thus the virus kills the population
most necessary to development: the teachers, doctors, and entrepreneurs as
well as the mothers and fathers raising children. In Uganda, high rates of
the HIV/AIDS infection corresponded with conflict and instability in the
country. As peace came in the mid-1980s, fewer people were displaced, soldiers and rebels returned to their barracks and hometowns, and infection
rates began to decline. Uganda also embraced the challenge of reducing
infection rates and launched a national educational campaign against
HIV/AIDS beginning in 1986. The slogan of "Abstinence, Be Faithful, or
Use a Condom"-often referred to as the ABC method-succeeded in getting across the message of safe sexual practices. The Ugandan model of
HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness has been widely applauded and has
shown significant results. President Yoweri Museveni supported the educa-
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tional campaign and articulated it from the capital city to the classrooms in
rural schools.

South Africa
South Africa has the most HIV-positive people of any country in the world.
It is at the peak rate for new infections, and little headway has yet been

made to bring the infection rate down. Of South Africa's 45 million people,
5.3 million are infected with HIV,11 and 25 percent of its economically
active individuals are infected.12 The staggering toll that AIDS is taking on
South Africa's social and economic fabric has only recently been acknowledged by the government. By 2000, the government began an AIDS prevention and treatment program, but it has been widely criticized for its ineffectiveness. In 2000, South Africa's ministry of health refused to provide
antiretroviral treatment for cost reasons, and President Thabo Mbeki publicly questioned whether HIV really caused AIDS.13 By 2002, the government began to work more closely with nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and promoted limited antiretroviral use. South Africa's government
will face a growing crisis as AIDS patients clog its health infrastructure and
the number of AIDS orphans grows.

Ethiopia
Like the South African government, the Ethiopian government was slow to
recognize the impact that HIV/AIDS could have on its country and was late
to begin education and prevention programs. Throughout the 1990s,
Ethiopia faced an in~reasing number of deaths from tuberculosis but failed
to link these deaths to opportunistic infections resulting from HIV/AIDS.
Under pressure from indigenous NGOs and international organizations, the
situation began to change in 1999. Ethiopia now recognizes that it has a
struggle ahead in terms of its efforts to cope with HIV/AIDS. Recently, it
began a significant effort to educate the population on the basics of virus
transmission. However, significant challenges remain, as surveys show that
young people have a lot of misconceptions about the disease, particularly in
the rural areas.14 A recently established government office, the National
HIV/AIDS Council, has not yet been as effective as it could be in focusing
attention and resources on the disease. One of the biggest challenges for
Ethiopia will be how to deal with the AIDS orphans in the next decade. By
some estimates, AIDS could orphan up to a quarter of all children in
Ethiopia by 2011. 15 These orphans will challenge the state's ability to provide education and jobs and will also drain a healthcare system that currently spends only $2 per year per citizen.16
These snapshots give some indication of the varied nature of the
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HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. It is everywhere a challenge to the state and
to fragile health care systems, but different countries are at different stages
of their response to HIV/AIDS. Muslim areas and states have generally
been less affected by HIV/AIDS, and West African average rates of infection have been lower than those in southern and East Africa (see Appendix
at end of chapter).

The Evolution of HIV/AIDS as a Perceived Security Threat
HIV/AIDS has existed as an epidemiological challenge on the African continent since the 1970s. From the 1980s onward, the HIV/AIDS pandemic
was recognized as a humanitarian crisis and an issue of human security.
International responses occurred primarily through NGO activity and international institutions tasked with health care, such as the World Health
Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and to some
extent the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Yet it was not
discussed in policy circles as a security threat until 1994, when ·
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth note.ct the risks to
state stability that develop in countries. seriously affected by AIDS.17 It was
not until 2000 that HIV/AIDS became more widely recognized as a security
threat. At that time the full impact of the disease on state capacity became
apparent to external observers.IS In 2000, the Clinton administration
requested $250 million in its 2001 budget to fight the global AIDS pandemic.19 The administration saw HIV/AIDS as a threat to the fledgling democracies on the African continent. It also commented on the, possibility of
AIDS contributing to failed states because of the state's inability to provide
security, health care, and education.20
What makes AIDS more than just an epidemiological crisis? Why has it
made the leap from disease to a security issue? I answer these questions in
the following section by examining the security concerns resulting from
HIV/AIDS at the national and international levels. Certainly, HIV/AIDS is a
threat to individual or human security: I show how the deaths of many individuals have turned HIV/AIDS into a national and international security
threat.

African National Security Interests
The greatest immediate security threat from HIV/AIDS infection at a
national level is that which comes from the weakening of the military when
a significant percentage of soldiers become infected with HIV/AIDS. If the
HIV infection rate keeps pace with other sexually transmitted diseases, the
threat to the military is considerable. Stefan Elbe has noted, "Prevalence
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rates of sexually transmitted diseases among military personnel usually
exceed those of the civilian population by a factor of two to five. In many
African militaries, this is also true with regard to HIV."21 In some countries,
the rates of HIV infection among the military are estimated to be as high as
50 to 60 percent.22 The number of infected soldiers in any given army is difficult to determine, and governments are understandably reluctant to make
this information public, even if they do know it with some certainty.
According to Robert L. Ostergard, "the public admission of what may be
high HIV infection rates among military personnel potentially compromises
national and military security for some states by revealing what could be a
substantial weakness in the military's combat readiness." 23 Even though
states thus have good reason to underestimate the rate of HIV infection in
their military, some data do exist. The Appendix at the end of this chapter
records the results of a concerted attempt to collect available infection rate
data among military personnel in Africa.
High rates of HIV infection in the military increase the amount of
money that needs to be devoted to recruitment, training, and health care.
Just as AIDS eliminates some of the most useful segments of the civilian
population, so too does it have a significant impact on the officer corps and
command structure of the armed forces. The training that goes into the
preparation of a single soldier is lost when he or she is affected by
HIV/AIDS and has to leave the armed forces. The average cost of training
per soldier increases overall when more recruits have to be trained to compensate for those who have to leave the army due to HIV.24 Moreover, that
particular soldier will not move up through the ranks and be available for
leadership oppprtunities or lend his battlefield experience to the force. The
end result of high rates of HIV infection will be a less experienced and
therefore less prepared armed force than one in which the rates are substantially lower. Recognizing the high costs of training and frequent turnover,
the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan armed forces in Africa have made
HIV testing mandatory for recruits. These countries then systematically
exclude those who test positive.25
If we can call the issue of HIV infection among soldiers the primary
threat to national security, the secondary and linked threat is the soldier as a
vector of HIV transmission among the population. Zimbabwe's army is an
example. By some estimates, the army from the late 1980s to 1990 was
more than 70 percent HIV-positive.26 These Zimbabwean forces were
deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s, undoubtedly
spreading the disease there. Such a high percentage of infected soldiers may
be unusual, but the scenario is not. Indeed, it is thought that the war in
Angola exacerbated the spread of HIV/AIDS globally in the 1970s and that
soldiers were the original vectors of the disease.27 Soldiers are particularly
vulnerable to HIV infection because of risky sexual behavior. They are
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often deployed far from wives and family, resulting in a greater propensity
to hire prostitutes and engage in the types of sexual activity associated with
high rates of HIV transmission. Also, in many parts of Africa, soldiers are
viewed as desirable mates because they have steady jobs and a reliable
income. Thus, the opportunities for soldiers to spread HIV through consensual sex are significant. Soldiers are also vectors in the spread of HIV
through nonconsensual sex, that is, rape. As has been documented in many
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, war, displacement, and genocide have led to
the rape of wo.men and girls and their subsequent infection with HIV. In
Rwanda, the spread of HIV/AIDS among Tutsi women through.rape was an
intentional part of the genocide.2s

International Security Threats
These national security threats emanating from high rates of HIV infection
are reflected in international security issues as well. Why would the high
rates of HIV infection be a problem for other states, and why would the
United States, in particular, be concerned about this issue? Three specific
issues regarding the spread of HIV represent either a threat to US interests
or a specific threat to US security: (1) the interest of the United States in
having African peacekeeping forces available for regional interventions, (2)
US investment in training African forces abroad in antiterrorism, and (3) the
threat of failed states.
Since the invasion of Somalia in 1992, the United States has had an
explicit preference for regional peacekeeping efforts in Africa rather than
the deployment of US forces. Accordingly, an attempt has been made to
train members of African militaries for peacekeeping operations. The most
prominent of these efforts has been the African Contingency Operations
Training Assistance program (ACOTA), which built on and expanded the
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program developed by the
Clinton administration. ACOTA focuses on training African militaries in the
development of a common peacekeeping doctrine, interoperability, and
standard communications technology. It seeks thereby to facilitate the effectiveness, coordination, and rapid deployment of African forces in response
to African humanitarian and security crises. The goal of ACRl/ACOTA is to
train eight to .ten African battalions of 600 to 800 soldiers, each with additional specialized companies for combat support.29 Countries receiving
training and funds though the ACOTA progr~m are expected to deploy their
troops quickly in response to UN requests for peacekeeping forces, something in which the United States has an interest. Senegal, Uganda, Malawi,
Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Cote d'Ivoire have thus far participated in training
exercises.30 US Army Special Operations officers staff the initial ten-week
training, which includes computer-simulated exercises. This initial training
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is followed up by refresher courses. The significant difference between
ACRI and ACOTA is that the latter includes training and equipment for
light infantry and small unit operations, which are intended to enable peacekeeping and peace enforcement in hostile environments. In addition, a
greater attempt is made to tailor the country programs to the specific needs
of each country.31
Yet as HIV/AIDS begins to take its toll on the armed forces, the ability
of those forces to deploy quickly in response to a threat is impeded. It is
also less likely that countries in which the armed forces are stretched thin
due to HIV/AIDS will be willing to participate in peacekeeping operations
or regional interventions. That was one of the earliest points of concern
with regard to HIVI AIDS and its effect on international security from the
perspective of the United States.32 Robert Ostergard has noted that in addition to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping operations and foreign
interventions, armed forces may be limited by HIV infection in their ability
to carry out operations in their own countries.33
However, the relationship between HIV infection and peacekeeping
operations is not everywhere problematized. In spite of US concerns
·about HIV I AIDS negatively affecting the availability of soldiers for
peacekeeping operations, the relationship between HIV and peacekeeping
may be fundamentally different. In some African militaries, peacekeeping operations have also served as an incentive for HIV/AIDS prevention
in Africa. The opportunity of a potentially lucrative and rewarding peacekeeping assignment is being used as an incentive to encourage HIV prevention in the Ghanaian military.34 The Ghanaian military high command
encourages HIV prevention and condom use. HIV-positive soldiers are
forbidden from serving on peacekeeping operations artd miss the prestige
and extra pay that these assignments bring. According to Brigadier
General Daniel Twum, "[Soldiers] are aware of this policy and make an
active personal effort to prevent themselves from catching the virus in
order to take part in these operations." The Ghanaian military has a lower
rate of HIV infection than the population at large, which currently has an
infection rate of 3.8 percent.35 General Twum's statement suggests that
African peacekeeping assignments may be an incentive for HIV/AIDS
prevention and should therefore be supported for reasons of both security
and public health.
As a consequence, evidence regarding peacekeeping is mixed. It is in
the interest of US security to have available African peacekeepers, and if
the Ghanaian case is any example, it also appears to be in the interest of
African armed forces as well. To the extent that peacekeeping is viewed as a
coveted assignment, setting high standards for peacekeepers, including
HIV-negative status, will lead to higher standards across the board for the
armed forces. It would help if policies mirroring those of the Ghanaian
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armed forces were implemented in other militaries and received the support
of countries to which these militaries are deployed. Such receiving countries may be reluctant to accept African peacekeepers who are HIVpositive.36 For example, Eritrea has asked that the UN not allow HIV-positive soldiers to be part of the UN peacekeeping force monitoring the border
between Eritrea and Ethiopia.37 Such policies raise important human rights
issues regarding discrimination against those who are HIV-positive and will
serve to further the stigmatization of HIV-positive people in African countries.
The focus on peacekeeping is just a subcategory of the largest type of
US investment in security in Africa-military-to-military contacts and
training. The second threat to US interests in Africa from HIV is the
increased cost of training armed forces in Africa for more traditional operations. The United States regularly trains African military forces. Some of
this training is funneled through ACOTA, but more traditional training
occurs through the International Military Education and Training program
(IMET), which has existed for decades to train African troops and officers
at US sites.38 In 2002, IMET trained approximately 1,600 members of
African armed forces. The countries that have been the largest recipients of
this training (in dollar amounts) include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.39 Defense dollars allocated to
IMET and ACOTA are designed to serve US interests abroad. However, if
HIVI AIDS is leading to the death, disability, or discharge of soldiers being
trained via IMET dollars, then the net benefit to the United States in terms
of security will decrease.40
IMET training is also linked to the global antiterrorism effort. Since the
September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has pushed both to strengthen the ACOTA program to enable it to train soldiers for more "robust"
assignments than peacekeeping41 and to shift the focus of US military training to those countries with terrorist threats in order to expand the reach of
the United States in the struggle against terrorism. 42 On March 11, 2002,
President George W. Bush noted, "We will not send American troops to
every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles
ahead."43
Thus the status of African armed forces is of critical importance to the
United States in terms of their ability to participate in peacekeeping and to
strengthen global antiterrorist efforts. It would be a great asset to African
militaries and to US national security interests if the United States provided
antiretroviral drugs to African armed forces as part of the US security strategy in Africa. That would address at least one aspect of the problem of
HIVI AIDS in African armed forces. If we can assume that those targeted for
IMET or ACOTA training have already been trained by their own militaries
and are at least of middle rank and that those selected for IMET and
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ACOTA training are some of the best and brightest, then the provision of
antiretroviral drugs would safeguard the investment of US training dollars
as well as the quality of the command structure of African militaries.
The third area in which HIV/AIDS presents a threat to US national
security is its impact on weak states. The armed forces serve as just one
example of the ways in which a state can be adversely affected by
HIV/AIDS. The same issues of investment in training and the development
of a hierarchy are replicated among the ranks of teachers, doctors, nurses,
politicians, and other educated people. There is a great fear that HIV/AIDS
will weaken African states and that those weak states will fail. The United
States and other countries now recognize that state failure in Afghanistan
provided an environment conducive for terrorists to train and organize their
attacks against Western targets. Failed states are a threat to global security.44
The United States therefore has a national security interest in making certain that state failure is contained so as to make the world a safer place and
the United States a safer country. September 11 revealed the danger of
allowing state failures and humanitarian emergencies to go unaddressed. In
Africa, examples of failed states such as Liberia and Somalia provide ready
illustrations that this fear has some foundation. Liberian state failure pushed
the whole Mano River region into war, creating the movement of arms and
people into nearby countries. Somalia is another African example, and in
that case state failure has been linked directly to terrorism. 45 Thus much of
the rhetoric coming from US government officials regarding HIV/AIDS in
Africa and national security uses state failure as the critical link between
these two issues.46 In the section below, I examine the recent US response
to that threat.

The Bush Administration and Global HIV/AIDS
The Bush administration embraced the HIV/AIDS threat as both a human
and a national security issue. In a 2002 speech, Colin Powell stated:
AIDS is not just a compelling moral issue; it is not just a humanitarian
issue; it is far more than just a health issue. It is a security issue. It is a
destroyer of nations. It is a destroyer of societies. It has the potential to
destabilize regions, perhaps even entire continents. It can tear the social
fabric apart within any nation. It can rob young democracies of citizens
they need to build freer, better futures for themselves and for their children. HIV/AIDS is an economic issue, leaving nations without human
resources to grow and develop, ultimately sapping global well-being.47

The desire to take some sort of national action on an issue that was
increasingly articulated as a humanitarian disaster as well as a national
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security threat led to the announcement of a new bill to fight global
HIV/AIDS. It was called the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR). The announcement was first made in the 2002 State of the
Union address. President Bush promised $15 billion over a five-year period to fight AIDS, or $3 billion per year, a sum that would have been a
huge increase over previous funding levels. After appropriations, that
number was substantially reduced, yet the final contribution remained significant. 48 In fiscal year 1995, the US government gave $127 million to
international HIV/AIDS programs. In fiscal year 2005, that allocation
reached $2.2 billion. The percentage of discretionary US government
AIDS funding going to international programs has increased from 3 percent in 1996 to 22 percent in 2004.49 Figure 7.1 depicts the increase.
In the PEPFAR legislation, international security issues are noted as
one of the pressing concerns justifying the extraordinary commitment of US
funds to fighting HIV/AIDS internationally:
HIV/AIDS weakens the defenses of countries severely affected by the
HIV/AIDS crisis through high infection rates among members of their military forces and voluntary peacekeeping personnel. According to

Figure 7.1 Federal Funding for International HIV/AIDS,
FYs 1995-2004 (excluding international research; US$ millions)
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UNAIDS, in sub-Saharan Africa, many military forces have infection rates
as much as five times that of the civilian population. HIV/AIDS poses a
serious security issue for the international community by increasing the
potential for political instability and economic devastation, particularly in
those countries and regions most severely affected by the disease; decreasing the capacity to resolve conflicts through the introduction of peacekeeping forces because the environments into which these forces are introduced pose a high risk for the spread of HIV/AIDS; and increasing the
vulnerability of local populations to HIV/AIDS in conflict zones from
peacekeeping troops with HIV infection rates significantly higher than
civilian populations.SO

Though it might be overstated, the US government takes the security threat
noted in the PEPFAR legislation seriously, and it has put HIV/AIDS on the US
agenda in terms of both security and the commitment of funds. Yet only twelve
African countries are covered by the PEPFAR legislation: Botswana, Cote
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Others are left out for reasons that
have not been made clear. Moreover, other countries at risk from the spread of
HIV/AIDS, most notably India, are not currently targeted for funding.
The substantial new funding represented by PEPFAR will affect human
security, even though the effort is motivated by national security.SI PEPFAR
legislation represents a different form of engagement than has previously
been present between the United States and Africa. The United States has
not previously dedicated so many resources to fighting a disease overseas,
nor has a disease been portrayed as a national security threat. In fact, AIDS
has been killing Africans in large numbers for fifteen years with little US
regard for its effects beyond the NGO level. However, the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, changed the way the US security establishment conceives of US interests. In the general reconceptualization of security, Africa
became far more important than it had been in the immediate post-Cold
War era, largely because of the threat of failed states.

US National Security and Public Health in Africa
Whatever the motivation for US concern with AIDS in Africa, the flow of
money to the continent to assist with the crisis being caused by AIDS deaths
and HIV infections will be welcomed. The question must be asked, Will this
money serve the goal of strengthening weak African states and bolstering
US security interests? If.past foreign aid targeted at public health and education is any example, the answer is no. If the United States pours money
into African states to strengthen their public health systems over a five-year
period, possibly African states will respond by withdrawing national fund-
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ing in the areas where foreign funds are coming in. To some degree that
makes sense: Why should states allocate scarce resources to areas that are
already receiving funding? In the past, NGO involvement in Africa has
resulted in states abdicating their responsibility to provide basic education
and health care to their citizenry.52 The ironic effect is that when states stop
providing these basic public goods, they grow weaker, despite the underlying intent of this funding initiative to strengthen African capabilities.
In addition, the timing of the PEPFAR legislation and its long-term
effects also give cause for concern. In the first year of funding, the US government requested less than $3 billion because of a stated desire to see the
infrastructure in place through which the aid can be funneled. The bill states
that 55 percent of the money allocated by the PEPFAR legislation would go
toward the purchase of antiretroviral drugs. That is good news indeed: with
treatment, HIV infection can change from a death sentence to a serious but
chronic disease. But when the five years of funding runs out, will Africans
just return to the business of dying?53
Additionally, it is unclear to what extent African governments see
HIV/AIDS as a security threat. Certainly, good reason exists for them to do
so. Yet for them, HIV/AIDS is also much more than a security threat. It is a
public health disaster that drains from state coffers precious funds needed to
combat even more pervasive diseases such as malaria. It is a drain on the
educational system and burdens the state with large numbers of orphans to
care for (or not to care for and then suffer the consequences). Moreover,
HIV/AIDS affects the efficiency of a country's workforce. One HIV-testing
project in Tanzania indicated that HIVI AIDS is the dominant cause of lost
labor productivity and thus has an impact on company revenue.54
HIV/AIDS also affects the efficiency of labor, when even those who are not
HIV-positive are obligated to care for the dying or to participate in frequent
funerals and ritualized memorials for those that have died.
The US focus on HIV/AIDS as a security issue could be a boon for
African governments struggling with their response to overwhelming numbers of HIV-positive citizens. Yet US and African perspectives seem to
diverge as African states struggle with more than just the security elements
of the AIDS pandemic. The burdens that structural adjustment places on
countries should also be noted. Although the US policy of support for combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic is laudable, it coexists with US support for
structural adjustment programs that promote fee-based health care and primary education. Some evidence links structural adjustment with the spread
of HIV/AIDS in Kenya, where the imposition of fees led to a decline in
attendance at clinics.55 With growing numbers of AIDS orphans and families impoverished by multiple AIDS deaths, the US support of fee-based
services puts these basic public goods out of the reach of those the United
States is trying to assist through targeted HIV/AIDS funding.
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Conclusion

Security threats emanating from the HIV/AIDS pandemic are played out in
an African context in which there are few ongoing international conflicts
and the primary goal of most states is development. In those countries with
high infection rates, HIV/AIDS has impeded overall development and lowered life expectancies significantly. It is important to recognize, however,
that the HIVI AIDS pandemic does not affect every country in Africa in a
similar fashion. Infection rates are substantially greater in southern Africa
and East Africa than in West and North Africa.
US interests regarding HIV/AIDS in Africa have evolved over time, from
exclusively humanitarian interests to those of international security. PEPFAR
is a short-term measure that will ameliorate but not eliminate, the threat of
failed states in Africa. Although it is laudable that the United States is active
in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, comprehensive programs, far beyond
the reach of those suggested by the PEPFAR legislation, will be needed to
establish long-term, sustainable HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Even with
comprehensive long-term educational and health care programs, the task has
only begun, for by many assessments Africa is not the only continent that will
experience the ravages of the AIDS epidemic. The next wave of increasing
HIV infections and AIDS deaths is expected to play out in Asia, particularly
on the Indian subcontinent. There, the security implications of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic will be magnified, as the issues of HIV infection within the armed
forces and the weakening of the state develop in a context of the IndiaPakistan conflict, the arms race, and the delicate situation in Kashmir.

Appendix: HIV Prevalence Rates, 2003

Country
Southern Africa
Swaziland
Botswana
Lesotho
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Namibia
Zambia

HIV/AIDS Prevalence
Among Individuals
15-49 Years Old, General
Population (percentage)

38.8
37.3
28.9
24.6
21.5
21.3
16.5

HIVI AIDS Prevalence,
Military Population
(percentage)

50
60--70

(continues)

Appendix, continued

Country

HIVI AIDS Prevalence
Among Individuals
15-49 Years Old, General
Population (percentage)

HIVI AIDS Prevalence,
Military Population
(percentage)

14.2
12.2
3.9

40-60

Malawi
Mozambique
Angola
East Africa
United Republic of Tanzania
Kenya
Burundia
Rwanda
Ethiopia
Uganda
Djibouti
Eritrea
Sudan
Somaliaa
Central Africa
Central African Republic
Gabon
Cameroon
Congo
Chad
Democratic Republic of Congo
Equatorial Guineaa
West Africa
Cote d'Ivoire
Sierra Leonea
Liberia
Nigeria
Burkina Faso
Togo
Guinea
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau a
Benin
Mali
Gambia
Niger
Senegal
Mauritania

8.8
6.7
6.0
5.1
4.4
4.1
2.9
2.7
2.3
1.0
13.5
8.1
6.9
4.9
4.8
4.2
3.4
7.0
7.0
5.9
5.4
4.2
4.1
3.2
3.1
2.8
1.9
1.9
1.2
1.2
0.8
0.4

15-30

10

10-25
40-60
10-20
61b
10-20

Sources:.Radhika Sarin, "A New Security Threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military," World Watch
16, no. 2 (March-April 2003): 16-22; Doctors for Life, "AIDS Statistics," Doctors for Life
Living Safely AIDS Projects, December 2000; Stefan Elbe, "HIV/AIDS and the Changing
Landscape of War in Africa," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 159-177; Kevin O'Brian,
"AIDS and African Armies," Atlantic Monthly 292, no. 1 (July 2003): 86-87; UNAIDS, "Table
of Country-Specific HIV/AIDS Estimates and Data, End 2003," 2004 Report on the Global
AIDS Epidemic, July 2004, www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/report_pdf.html. These numbers of'
HIV-infected people were calculated as a percentage of the population given by UNDP for 2003.
Notes: a. 2001 figures.
b. 1998 figure.
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